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Introduction 
 
“India is still recovering from a bad case of old-fashioned socialism
1
…” 
 
When I was asked to write a book -review on Professor Vijay Joshi’s recent work (India's Long Road: The 
Search for Prosperity), I had never written one before. How could one comment in less than 1000 words 
(specified limit for most publications) a comprehensive scholarly work that runs into over four hundred 
pages (and lists nearly 500 works in its bibliography)? But I was assured I could learn. This meant my 
supervisors were flexible with time (and perhaps with the ‘quality’ of output). To begin with the learning 
exercise, I read a few reviews of the book. In searching for reviews, I came across a lecture which the  
author had delivered at a prominent university department
2
. The above quote comes from the lecture. 
Paradoxically, the author himself suggests that only three countries – South Korea, Taiwan and more 
recently China – have had rapid and sustained economic growth for three decades (Chapter. 1). I say 
paradoxically because in all the three cases, including in recent cases of rapid economic growth such as 
Vietnam, there have been elements of so -called socialism as the states have played roles far greater 
than that of the oft-prescribed gatekeeper and night-watchman. In fact, they continue to play an active 
part in enabling structural transformation. Other late-developers such as Germany and Japan have had 
(and continue to have) similar orders. The kind of role the respective states have played in the three  
countries (e.g. the active and broad-based industrial policy) is too well-documented
3
 to overlook. At the 
risk of oversimplification, it appears meaningful to contend that policies around growth and 
development have usually been about a mix of both ‘socialist’ and ‘non-socialist’ ideals. The two models 
of governance, if you will, have barely functioned as silos. 
 
This article is mostly a book-review but I take a slightly revisionist approach across several generally 
accepted conventions, for example, the length (the article goes well-beyond the 1000-word convention). 
The ‘deviation’ from rules, however, has specific objectives. I have critically analysed Joshi’s work and in 
so doing include relevant evidence, debates and questions not just from economics but also from other 
disciplines such as history and political science.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 The author delivering The Corden Lecture at the University of Melbourne, 2017 (Goerge, 2017) 
2 See (Goerge, 2017)  
3 See (Amsden, 1989; Amsden & Chu, 2003; Evans, 1995; Wade, 2004, Weiss, 2005) 
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Reviewing India’s Long Road 
 
What policies and reforms can put India on the path of rapid and sustained economic growth (or 
prosperity
4
)? The book sheds light on, not just the required policy initiatives and reforms (several 
critically  impending
5
),  but  also  the  probable  explanations  underlying  the  suboptimal  growth  
performance and development outcomes. The book is written for a wide audience – economists, policy-
makers and students - among others. 
 
Compared to sub 1 per cent economic growth between 1900 and 1950, India, a manifestly ‘free market’ 
economy then (an era where countries like the US, Japan and Germany used active Hamiltonian policies to 
build production transformation capabilities), achieved a rather commendable 3.5 per cent growth between 
1950 and 1980. The economic growth in the three decades between 1950 and 1980 appears reasonable 
because India was constrained owing to factors like severe droughts, multiple wars and the most critical of 
all, the political challenge to keep a diverse society together. Maintaining political unity within the framework  
of a democracy has been an accomplishment
6
 and in fact serves as a model for other diverse nations. Joshi 
notes that the ‘Hindu growth’ (1950 - 1980) is suboptimal when compared to other developing countries 
(primarily Korea). India indeed could not achieve the same economic growth as Korea did but nor did 
countries like Pakistan or Philippines, then relatively advanced compared to Korea. For Joshi, explanations for 
the divergent path lie in factors like Korea’s initial conditions (greater literacy compared to countries like 
India for example, Chapter. 2), India’s statist command and control policies and regulations that produced 
inefficiencies as well as a general contempt for the price mechanism (Chapter. 2). While there were indeed 
differences in the initial conditions, such conditions did not come from nowhere and in fact the institutional 
processes that led to such conditions impact development outcomes. In fact, understanding the evolutionary 
process of institutions – societal and political – offers a credible window as to why similar policies (such as 
active industrial policies in both India and Pakistan) yielded such varying outcomes
7
. As a society, Korea has  
had a different path of evolution
8
 owing to, among other things, a deep and highly repressive Japanese 
colonialism. The society and its institutions got so structured that subsidy-receivers (the firms) could be 
credibly disciplined to perform (or meet export targets set by planners)
9
. Indeed, the dominant strand of 
economic analysis, often with which economics is considered synonymous with, considers itself a physical 
science and has  
 
 
4 Per capita income like a country like Portugal where the author posits that the national income is widely shared 
while even the poorest have reasonable standards of living)
  
5 Reforming public health for example (Chapter. 9) 
 
6 Historian Ramachandra Guha argues that while countries like Pakistan could not accommodate credible demands from powerful 
factions (such as on linguistic autonomy) and saw major conflicts, the shifting political equilibrium allowed numerous often warring 
factions to co-exist in India (not from the book, The New Indian Express, 2017)).
  
7 See (M. H. Khan & Blankenburg, 2009; Kohli, 1997)  
8 See (Kohli, 1997)  
9 See (Khan & Blankenburg, 2009) 
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been extremely apolitical and ahistorical and even if it dwells into history, much of it is rather superficial 
often bordering around sensationalism. 
 
India’s development outcomes (in metrics like the number of people below poverty line, Chapter 2) in the 
three decades of so-called ‘Hindu’ growth, were not very encouraging. In explaining the suboptimal economic 
growth and the rather modest outcomes, Joshi contends that the state-driven command and control policies  
- planning driven dominance of public undertakings (PSUs) in economic activities, licensing on entry, exit and 
investment and protectionist trade among others created inefficiencies and distortions. It appears that the 
several exogenous shocks - droughts and war in mid 1960s and droughts and war and quadrupling of oil 
prices in the 1970s among others – constrained sizably the capabilities of the state (captured well by Joshi’s 
previous work of which he is co-author
10
). The rise in oil prices resulted in rapid deterioration in terms of 
trade in 1979, also the point at which the structural break occurred. 
 
Professor Joshi attributes the structural break and the subsequent increase in economic growth to 
“marketization, hesitatingly first, explicitly then (Chapter. 2)”. The work, however, almost flatly ignores 
critical micro-meso-developments between 1950 and 1980 that have been instrumental in the emergence of 
many competitive sectors of today such as the automobiles, IT and pharmaceuticals (among the top export 
items). These are among the flagship sectors responsible significantly for India’s growth and development 
story as well as for India’s reputation as a sophisticated manufacturing hub. Public Sector Undertakings (or 
PSUs) like Bharat Electronics Limited, founded in 1954, functioned as a training ground for thousands of  
engineers
11
. The PSU churned out thousands of trained engineers and this essentially was the groundwork 
for turning Bangalore into the Technopolis of today (Evans, 1995). Others have stressed on how the 
prestigious Indian Institute of Technology (the IITs) and the Indian Institute of Management (the IIMs) 
graduates form the core human resource base in sectors like IT and manufacturing (Rajan et al, 2006). Both 
the IIT and the IIM are part of the Nehruvian legacy. The extremely competitive automobile sector (India in  
FY16 has exported more cars than China
12
), it’s foundation was laid when in the 1980s, Suzuki was roped in 
for a joint-venture (JV). The JV became possible because the highest political leadership was committed for it 
while capable Indian bureaucrats were scouting for the potential partners (Khan, 2015). Maruti-Suzuki 
started off amid heavy protection (85% tariff) or a guaranteed domestic market though this was conditional 
upon time-bound local content requirements. Since then, the expansion in the automobile sector has led to 
development of credible linkages such as emergence of large number of world-class auto-component 
manufacturers (ibid.). Joshi’s work, much like the dominant ‘development and prosperity research’, fails to 
acknowledge that states, the most credible organized institution in a typical resource and capability starved 
society, are instrumental to societal learning, capability building and promotion of sectors with greater 
growth potential. 
 
Professor Joshi associates the late 1970s and early 1980s with the ‘unleashing of animal spirits’ or a period 
that saw relatively high economic growth compared to the past. This is in line with how most other  
economics research looks at the structural break issue in India
13
. The fundamental assumption (partially 
tenable indeed) is that relatively rapid economic growth will result into greater societal progress or  
 
 
10
 See (Joshi et al, 1998) 
11
 See (Evans, 1995) 
12
 See (Kulkarni, 2016)  
13
 See (Rajan, 2006; Rodrik & Subramanian, 2004) 
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development. As one of the repercussions of such premise, it would not be wrong to assume that the period 
since the late 1970s is assumed as one with relatively rapid growth and development. However, such broad-
brush analysis cannot be trusted to capture wellbeing. Between late 1970s and mid 1980s, the phase, the so-
called ‘animal spirits’ phase (Chapter. 4), saw almost 50,000 textile-sector workers lose their jobs in the  
textile city of Ahmedabad (Shani, 2007
14
). Joblessness meant widespread deprivation became a norm as the 
other sectors (mostly informal services or odd-jobs) fetched the workers a quarter of what they earned in 
textiles (ibid.). Recently, the demonetization in India has wreaked havoc on the informal sector workers. Bear 
in mind that over 80% of the workers in India are in the informal sector. Despite the misery among workers in 
sectors like construction that employs millions, the recent economic survey neither has aggregate data nor 
cases-studies on the hardships faced by the largely voiceless workers (Economic Survey, 2018). If the issues 
concerning majority workers remain invisible, can solely the current order of ‘economics and economists’ 
guided policy processes be relied upon to solve societal challenges? Indeed the ‘omission’ could be driven by 
factors such as political considerations (as perhaps is the case with India and its current regime’s 
demonetization shock). Imminent is a major rejig in the way development policy is guided and researched 
upon. Reading economic growth rates and considering it a proxy for wellbeing is problematic. Hence, more 
initiatives like the reassessing the measurement dynamics of societal progress (See Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 
2009) are critically impending. 
 
The 1990s liberalization occurred amid a major fiscal crisis where IMF credit support was conditional on 
reforms – inter alia, devaluation, tariff reduction and elimination of quantitative restrictions on essential 
imports such as machinery, and delicensing (Chapter 4). The 1990s saw over 5.5% growth fueled by 
rising, more stable investments and greater production efficiency driven by smooth imports of required 
inputs. The 2000s, specifically the 2003-2010 phase has registered the fastest growth so far, over 8%, in 
line with global buoyancy and largely via heavy firm level borrowing and increased corporate savings 
and investments. Beginning in 2011 and exacerbated by the global financial meltdown, the growth has 
slowed down at 5% on average amid declining corporate investment. The book argues that this occurred 
because of deleveraging among corporates and governance failures such as scandals (Chapter 4). 
 
Dr. Joshi argues that despite the ingredients – macroeconomic stability, no serious conflicts and non-
extractive governance - among others, India grapples with suboptimal growth and development (jobless 
growth and severe underemployment). Creating good-quality jobs is certainly a complex yet urgent challenge 
for every society (Andreoni et al, 2016). Most economic research contends that India has missed the labour-
intensive industrialisation bus and in explaining this, economists including Professor Joshi have attributed 
factors like, inter alia, India’s restrictive labour laws. The ‘restrictive labour law line’ of research while widely  
cited has also been recently contested
15
. On the other hand, much of those employed are in the informal 
sector. Despite churning out half the industrial output (Chapter. 5), the informal sector workers (over 80% of 
those employed are in the informal sector), other than being miserably paid, are vulnerable and voiceless in 
an order where a disproportionate extremely unfair value share is captured by capital. The current 
exploitative order that has persisted rather dangerously in India, perhaps solely benefits capital albeit only in 
the short-termist narrow sense. The adverse rent seeking dynamics perhaps  
 
 
 
 
14
 See (Pp 37-41 in Shani, 2007) 
15
 See (P. Bardhan, 2015) for a brief discussion 
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explain the burgeoning inequality
16
 and the fact the major capitalist houses in 1947 continue to be so. 
Dr. Joshi rightly contends that India continues to experience largely jobless growth because of its 
inability to expand labour-intensive manufacturing and in this, the principal constraints are, – inter alia, 
poor quality physical infrastructure, lack of credible skills among workers, poor SME finance access, 
minimally conducive business environment (corrupt tax officials) and the employment protection laws 
(that require firms above a certain size to obtain permission for, inter alia, laying off workers, Chapter 
6). On whether credible industrial policy interventions are a potential policy measure, the author 
suggests that such interventions – ‘requires a smart, dispassionate and benevolent state which can ‘pick 
winners’ - (See Chapter. 6). Professor Joshi goes on to argue that countries like India should avoid the 
primrose path of such policies because such policies have a thin ‘empirical case’ (Chapter 6). Joshi’s brief 
insight on industrial policy is extremely narrow and in fact reflects a superficial understanding of 
dynamics like industrial policy driven learning. For example, India’s real exchange rate has appreciated 
by nearly over 20 per cent since 2014 and this has sizably hurt exports. While Joshi does highlight this 
issue around the appreciation (Chapter 8), he perhaps is not aware that, in fact, preventing real 
exchange rate appreciation (among other exchange rate management strategies) is itself a major 
industrial policy tool (as argued by equally if not more illustrious economists, See Guzman, Ocampo, & 
Stiglitz, 2017). Perhaps Joshi’s áversion’ to industrial policy stems from an ideological (so-called free 
markets guided by the invisible hand) and normative epistemological standing which contradict his own 
philosophical premise that dispassionate and objective (read rational) approaches are almost always 
desirable (as Dr. Joshi argues that states should not intervene for example via an industrial policy 
because they may not be dispassionate, smart and objective). 
 
While there have been modest improvements, India continues to fare poorly in critical development 
outcomes such as nutrition and infant and maternal mortality. India’s performance compares poorly to 
several of its regional peers who have significantly lower per capita incomes. This contention, though  
debated by a few citing technical grounds
17
 is widely agreed upon including in this work (Chapter 9). 
Professor Joshi insightfully dwells into how public health interventions such as immunization, basic 
sanitation, nutrition and other preventive and promotional healthcare measures – which impact overall 
health outcomes significantly, are largely neglected and underfunded (less than 10% of state health 
expenditure, Chapter 9). Indeed the Dr. Joshi links the appalling outcomes to the weak preventive and 
promotional public health services. In explaining this, the author delves into history as well as political 
economy contending that it was the powerful medical lobby that got public health merged into medical 
services (Pp. 189). In what is a display of his erudition, Dr. Joshi evidences that Tamilnadu, which has 
much better health and overall development outcomes, bucked the broader trend by retaining a 
dedicated public health service. For a host of reasons including an inappropriate incentive structure, 
medical services, associated largely with curative health, addresses only partially the overall health-
related challenges.  
 
 
 
16 See (Rangarajan & Dev, 2018) 
 
17 Economists like Bhagwati suggest limitations in the way infant mortality rates in countries like Bangladesh are computed 
(Bhagwati & Panagariya, 2013). Despite ‘technical arguments’, there is consensus that social underdevelopment and 
multidimensional deprivations are widespread in India.
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Widespread multidimensional deprivation has been common in India despite dozens of targeted 
subsidies and welfare programs. While welfare entitlements like income guarantees have indeed played 
a role in tackling extreme deprivation and hunger, chronic poverty is rampant. Nearly half the labor 
force is into low productivity agriculture and over 200 million people are below the poverty line (Chapter 
10). The author proposes a universal basic income (UBI), which raises average incomes to the poverty 
line. This is indeed a commendable prescription (Chapter 10). UBI, the author estimates, will require 
funding at around 4 per cent of the GDP and that the fiscal space can be created by freeing up resources 
from existing subsidy programs, whose effectiveness, as has been documented widely, has been widely  
questioned
18
. In building the case for UBI, Professor Joshi evidences that targeted subsidies such as the 
Public Distribution System (PDS, subsidized food grains) have been utter failures in terms of providing 
reprieve to the poorest. In fact, the targeted subsidies, a significant chunk, is exploited by unintended 
beneficiaries (though this lot perhaps is not necessarily well-off) often by diverting grains to the black 
market (Chapter 10). The author documents cases like Chhatisgarh where over 90% households are 
enlisted as Below Poverty Line (BPL) while the number of BPL cards issued exceeds the overall 
population. The section on UBI indeed documents the failures of targeted subsidies but (perhaps the 
mark of a credible academician) it does not shy away from highlighting intricacies in devising public 
policy and how policy outcomes can be non-linear and unpredictable. In Tamilnadu, unlike Chattisgarh, 
the leakages in targeted PDS are less than 10 per cent. The author evidences complexities in other 
welfare programs like National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREGA) where there are inefficiencies 
such as delayed payments but it has benefitted the poorest due to the program’s attributes’ such as self-
selection where only the poorest turn-up asking for work. 
 
To tackle the leakages in targeted PDS, Professor Joshi suggests replacing the multitude of subsidies with 
Aadhar (National Biometric Identity Card) linked cash transfers. Indeed, and as Joshi notes, India has the 
technology to implement cash transfers. On resources, the author rightly argues that subsidies - on fertilizer, 
coal, electricity and railway fares – largely benefit the thriving and often promote, for instance, unsustainable 
overuse. The author estimates that non-merit subsidies are roughly 12%, of the GDP and that resources can 
be freed up to finance the UBI (Chapter 10). However, the proposition that non-merit subsidies can be  
reduced to fund a UBI, indeed a reasonable proposal which has been proposed repeatedly
19
, raises a host of 
fundamental questions. Subsidies such as in fertilizer or agriculture being tax-free, are essentially rents and 
redistribution mechanisms to powerful factions and classes which can destabilize the regime
20
. The rents,  
distributed through legal as well as non-legal means, fuel the patronage network and ensure their loyalty
21
. 
The rents are a necessary element to ensure the political equilibrium, in absence of which there may not be  
political stability
22
. If we go by the dynamics comprehensively outlined by the World Development Report 
2017, the subsidies are here to stay till major  
 
 
 
18
 See (Sen, A. 2014) 
19
 See (Economic Survey, 2018) 
 
20
 See (M. Khan, 2017) 
21
 See (KELSALL, 2018) 
22
 See (World Bank, 2017) 
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structural transformation takes place where there are several competitive sectors that enable arms-
length based functioning. After all, several governments have come and gone by but the competitive 
clientelist order, certain variants of which do produce growth enhancing stability, remains intact
23
. 
 
It was felt, perhaps rightly, that the current BJP government has the mandate to tread difficult paths and 
implement difficult decisions unlike a typical coalition government with, inter alia ideological 
differences. However, the actual policy paths taken (such as hasty adoption of demonetization) as well 
as the outcomes (often owing to poor designs such as in the GST) have been somewhat divergent often 
disappointing than anticipated. The difficulties in disbanding several unwanted subsidies on welfare 
programs have multiple dimensions and complexities when it comes to design or actual implementation. 
A particularly relevant paradigm that enables a greater understanding of how societal, economic and 
political distribution of power affects policy design and outcomes is the political settlements (PS)  
theory
24
. The PS theory argues that it stability in developing societies is largely a function of allocation 
of rents to the most powerful factions (with mobilization and hence destabilizing capabilities) and that 
the political equilibrium eventually is set at the actual distribution of power rather than what formal 
mechanisms (such as being a state) confers. Indeed, that policy designs and outcomes are significantly  
determined on distribution of power and the political settlements has been widely accepted
25
. In this 
sense, technocratic physical science like estimations based on hyperbolic assumptions serve no purpose 
when it comes to application. To the readers dismay, Joshi’s work is largely of the physical sciences type 
where economists with a specific ‘orientation’ if you will do not find political and sociological 
explanations objective enough (and ‘quantifiable’ enough). 
 
This is not to suggest that the author does not delve into the more realistic side of affairs. Welcome as it 
is, the author, in the concluding chapter (Chapter 13) contends that the BJP should not toe the line of 
the RSS (BJP’s parent organization) as doing so runs the risk of not just curtailment of individual 
freedoms but also the imposition of majoritarian tyranny. Indeed (and with the benefit of hindsight), if 
one goes by statements (perhaps aspirations) made by most BJP legislators (including the PM and ones 
with Ivy-league training in economics
26
), one gets a sense that not everything is alright when it comes 
to stability and progress in India. 
 
 
 
To sum up… 
 
For India’s continental size and numerous heterogeneities across, for example, among the states and their 
levels of economic and institutional development, it is indeed a challenge for any scholar to provide an 
aggregate macro policy perspective and at the same time, cater to numerous non-uniformities. In this sense, 
the book, with nearly 500 works in the bibliography, does well to address several questions it  
 
 
23
 See (P. Bardhan, 2015; Pranab Bardhan, 2010; Pranab Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2000) 
24
 See (KELSALL, 2018; M. H. Khan, n.d., 2010, 2012) 
 
25
 See (UNIDO, 2016; World Bank, 2017) 
26 See (Ghosal, 2015) 
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outlines. However, and as can be established from Hume’s law, no normative prescription is derived 
from a positive analysis unless there is a normative idea as an assumption. It is for the readers to infer 
for themselves the normative assumptions in this extremely useful scholarly work. 
 
 
 
References 
 
Amsden, A.H. (1989). Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Sen, A. (2014). Amartya Sen and and his seven wishes at the JLF. Firstpost. Retrieved January 31, 2018, 
from http://www.firstpost.com/living/amartya-sen-and-his-seven-wishes-at-the-jlf-1345683.html 
 
Amsden, A. H. (Alice H., & Chu, W. (2003). Beyond late development : Taiwan’s upgrading policies. MIT 
Press. 
 
Andreoni, A., & Chang, H.-J. (2016). Bringing production and employment back into development: Alice 
Amsden’s legacy for a new developmentalist agenda. Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and 
Society, 10(1), 173–187. https://doi.org/10.1093/cjres/rsw029 
 
Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues. Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 
1320–1346. https://doi.org/10.2307/2729979 
 
Bardhan, P. (2015). Reflections on Kalyan Sanyal’s Rethinking Capitalist Development. Economic and 
Political Weekly, 53(21), 7–8. Retrieved from 
https://www.epw.in/journal/2018/21/commentary/reflections-kalyan-sanyals-rethinking-capitalist-
development.html 
 
Bardhan, P., & Mookherjee, D. (2000). Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels. American 
Economic Review, 90(2), 135–139. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.135 
 
Bhagwati, J. N., & Panagariya, A. (2013). Why growth matters : how economic growth in India reduced 
poverty and the lessons for other developing countries. Public Affairs, Perseus Books Group. 
 
Economic Survey. (2018). State of the Economy: An Analytical Overview and Outlook for Policy. In 
Economic Survey 2018. Ministry of Finance, Government of India. Retrieved from 
http://mofapp.nic.in:8080/economicsurvey/pdf/001-031_Chapter_01_ENGLISH_Vol_01_2017-18.pdf 
 
Evans, P. B. (1995). Embedded autonomy : States and industrial transformation. Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Ghosal, A. (2015). Hindu majority requisite for democracy, says Swamy. Retrieved June 22, 2018, from 
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/hindu-majority-requisite-for-democracy-says-
swamy/ 
 
Goerge, V. (2017). Can India be the next China or South Korea? Retrieved February 23, 2018, from 
http://fbe.unimelb.edu.au/newsroom/can-india-be-the-next-china-or-south-korea 
 
Guzman, M., Ocampo, J. A., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2017). Real Exchange Rate Policies for Economic 
Development (NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES). Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w23868 
 
Joshi, V., Little, I. M. D., & World Bank. (1998). India : macroeconomics and political economy, 1964-
1991. Oxford University Press. 
 
KELSALL, T. (2018). Towards a universal political settlement concept: A response to Mushtaq khan. 
African Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady018 
 
Khan, M. (2015). The Role of Industrial Policy: Lessons from Asia. In P. R. Bailey, David  Cowling, Keith 
and Tomlinson (Ed.), New Perspectives on Industrial Policy for a Modern Britain (pp. 79–98). Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. Retrieved from http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/19849/1/Ch5 Role of Industrial Policy 
Lessons from Asia.pdf 
 
Khan, M. (2017). Anti-Corruption in Bangladesh: A political settlements analysis. Retrieved from 
https://ace.soas.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/ACE-WorkingPaper003-BD-AntiCorruption-
170907.pdf 
 
Khan, Mushtaq (2012) 'Governance and Growth Challenges for Africa.' In: Noman, Akbar and Botchwey, 
Kwesi and Stein, Howard and Stiglitz, Joseph, (eds.), Good Growth and Governance in Africa: Rethinking 
Development Strategies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 114-139.  
 
Khan, M. H. (2010). Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions. 
Retrieved from https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/9968/1/Political_Settlements_internet.pdf 
 
Khan, M. H. (2012). Governance and Growth: History, Ideology and Methods of Proof. In J. Noman, 
Akbar and Botchwey, Kwesi and Stein, Howard and Stiglitz (Ed.), Good Growth and Governance in Africa: 
Rethinking Development Strategies (pp. 51–79). Oxford University Press. Retrieved from 
http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/17299/1/Governance and Growth History Ideology and Methods of Proof.pdf 
 
Khan, M. H., & Blankenburg, S. (2009). The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Asia and Latin 
America. In Industrial Policy and Development (pp. 336–377). Oxford University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199235261.003.0013 
 
Kohli, A. (1997). Japanese colonialism and Korean development: A reply. World Development, 25(6), 
883–888. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0305-750X(97)00009-0 
 
Kulkarni, T. (2016). India surpasses China in passenger car exports. Retrieved March 15, 2018, from 
http://www.autocarpro.in/analysis-reports/india-surpasses-china-passenger-car-exports-20224 
 
Rajan, R. and others. (2006). India’s Patterns of Development: What Happened, What Follows (NBER 
WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 12023). Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w12023 
 
Rangarajan, C., & Dev, M. (2018). How the data sets stack up - OPINION - The Hindu. Retrieved April 4, 
2018, from http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/how-the-data-sets-stack-
up/article23428911.ece 
 
Rodrik, D., & Subramanian, A. (2004). FROM “HINDU GROWTH” TO PRODUCTIVITY SURGE: THE 
MYSTERY OF THE INDIAN GROWTH TRANSITION (NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 10376). Cambridge. 
Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2004/00-00/rodrik.pdf 
 
Shani, O. (2007). Communalism, caste, and Hindu nationalism : the violence in Gujarat. Cambridge 
University Press. Retrieved from 
https://books.google.com.np/books/about/Communalism_Caste_and_Hindu_Nationalism.html?id=HtpF
uh8EcFkC&redir_esc=y 
 
Stiglitz, J. ., Sen, A., & Fitoussi, J.-P. (2009). Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. 
Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/118025/118123/Fitoussi+Commission+report 
 
The New Indian Express. (2017). India’s survival is a miracle: Ramachandra Guha. Retrieved February 23, 
2018, from http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/jan/26/indias-survival-is-a-miracle-
ramachandra-guha-1563748.html 
 
UNIDO. (2016). Industrial Development Report 2016 :The Role of Technology and Innovation in Inclusive 
and Sustainable Industrial Development. Vienna. Retrieved from 
https://www.unido.org/sites/default/files/2015-12/EBOOK_IDR2016_FULLREPORT_0.pdf 
 
Wade, R. (2004). Governing the market : economic theory and the role of government in East Asian 
industrialization. Princeton University Press. Retrieved from 
https://press.princeton.edu/titles/4724.html 
 
Weiss, J. (2005). Export Growth and Industrial Policy: Lessons from the East Asian Miracle experience 
(ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 26). Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTEXPCOMNET/Resources/2463593-
1213975515123/17_Weiss.pdf 
 
World Bank. (2017). World Development Report 2017: Governance and the Law. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2017 
